warfare-msg - 5/30/11 Period warfare. NOTE: See also the files: Women-Battle-art, wounds-msg, siege-engines-msg, mercenaries-msg, battle-ideas-msg, pottery-wepns-msg, p-armor-msg. ************************************************************************ NOTICE - This file is a collection of various messages having a common theme that I have collected from my reading of the various computer networks. Some messages date back to 1989, some may be as recent as yesterday. This file is part of a collection of files called Stefan's Florilegium. These files are available on the Internet at: http://www.florilegium.org I have done a limited amount of editing. Messages having to do with separate topics were sometimes split into different files and sometimes extraneous information was removed. For instance, the message IDs were removed to save space and remove clutter. The comments made in these messages are not necessarily my viewpoints. I make no claims as to the accuracy of the information given by the individual authors. Please respect the time and efforts of those who have written these messages. The copyright status of these messages is unclear at this time. If information is published from these messages, please give credit to the originator(s). Thank you, Mark S. Harris AKA: THLord Stefan li Rous Stefan at florilegium.org ************************************************************************ From: jvincent at eagle.wesleyan.edu (The Ulair) Date: 25 Sep 91 20:12:09 GMT Organization: Wesleyan University Greetings to the Rialto from Eirik Bjarnason! Recently, one good gentle inquired as to the size of armies during our lives. I shall present the results I have found in the works of the learned clerk J.F.Verbruggen in his "The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages". The figures cited are for the First Crusade and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Date Battle #of Knights #of foot-soldiers --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1098 Battle of The Lake of Antioch 700 ------- Battle of Antioch (500-600) ------- 1099 Ascalon 1,200 9,000 1101 Ramla 260 900 1102 Ramla 200 ------ 1102 Jaffa 200 1105 Ramla 700 2,000 1119 Athareb 700 3,000 1119 Hab 700 1125 Hazarth 1,100 2,000 Also, at Bremule Louis VI fought Henry I {then Duke of Normandy} with 400 to 500 knights, respectively. In 1217, the English King used 400 knights and 347 crossbowmen against his rebellious barons, who had 611 knights and 1,000 foot soldiers. As additional evidence that such forces were small, feudal rolls and documents show that in Normandy in 1172 only 581 knights had to be raised for the Duke's army from 1,500 fiefs. In Brittany in 1294, 166 knights and 16 squires were obliged to perform military service for the Duke. Hopefully soon, I will have an analysis of major battles of the Hundred Years' War completed. Additional comments or requests are welcome. I hope this will help shed some small illumination on the nature of battles during our time. Yours in Service, Eirik Bjarnason Haven's End Barony of Dragonship Haven East Kingdom From: sbloch at euler.ucsd.edu (Steve Bloch) Date: 28 Sep 91 16:41:21 GMT Organization: Mathematics at UCSD jvincent at eagle.wesleyan.edu (The Ulair) lists some sample army sizes from the time of the First Crusade, the largest example by far being the Battle of Ascalon, with 1200 knights and 9000 grunts. I would point out that Compleat Anachronist #56 gives a similar list for major battles of the Byzantine empire, and the numbers there are an order of magnitude larger, the largest being the Battle of Amorium (year 838) with a total 170,000 troops in the field. -- Stephen Bloch mar-Joshua ibn-Eleazar ha-Shalib >sca>Caid>Calafia>St.Artemas sbloch at math.ucsd.edu Date: Wed, 20 Nov 91 00:06 EDT From: JRECHTSCHAFF at hamp.hampshire.edu Subject: Numbers at Crecy Greetings to Rialto, A few digests ago, a gentle posted that there were 20,000 crossbowmen at the battle of Crecy in 1346. According to Alfred Burne in his book _The Crecy War_, there were about 6,000 crossbowmen, the French army as a whole at the battle totalled around 40,000. (p175-76). The crossbowmen were placed in a terrible position and were caught between the English archers and cannon and the French knights who rode them down from behind. It did not help that the Count d'Alencon, brother of King Philip VI, suspected the crossbowmen were traitors (they were actually fleeing from the English arrows) and ordered his division to ride them down. Needless to say, the crossbowmen (Genoese mercanaries) started attacking the French in self- defense. Alecon was killed in the Fray. The English army, by the way, numbered around 12,000 to 13,000 (Crecy War p.170). Reference: Alfred H. Burne _The Crecy War_ (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955) In Service, Lyanna ferch Gwynhelek of Bergental Barony of Bergental EK 24 Jan 92 From: kleber at husc10.harvard.edu (Gwydden "Galen" ap Hafgan) Newsgroups: rec.org.sca Organization: Harvard University Science Center Quoth Dave.Aronson at f120.n109.z1.FidoNet.Org (Dave Aronson): >I have a question about the oil that was heated or set afire and then >poured from battlements onto attackers. What SORT of oil was it >usually? Mineral? Vegetable? Animal? Please be as specific as >possible. Ten queue. According to my high school history teacher (well, *I* consider her authoritative... :-), that's another of those "false facts"-- no castle in its right mind would have poured precious oil over the walls just to scald enemies. Especially if you're under seige, you want all your resources conserved-- and boiling the old laundry water might not get as hot, but it sure don't hurt any less, and there's a whole lot more of it! --Gwydden ("Galen") ap Hafgan I don't have an overactive Provost of the Borough of Duncharloch imagination... I have an --kleber at husc.harvard.edu underactive reality... --EG 25 Jan 92 From: dani at netcom.COM (Dani Zweig) Newsgroups: rec.org.sca Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) Dave.Aronson at f120.n109.z1.FidoNet.Org (Dave Aronson): >I have a question about the oil that was heated or set afire and then >poured from battlements onto attackers. What SORT of oil was it usually? >Mineral? Vegetable? Animal? Please be as specific as possible. Not as specific as I'd prefer but... Pouring *burning* oil would be hideously expensive, and not very practical. Oil heated to the boiling point (any sort would do, but in practice it's going to be vegetable) is still too expensive to be a routine ploy, but it could be highly effective in restricted emergency situations. (If you've ever been spattered by a single drop of hot oil, you'll know that it's distracting.) ----- Dani of the Seven Wells dani at netcom.com 26 Jan 92 From: bill at psych.toronto.edu (Bill Pusztai) Organization: Dept. of Psychology, University of Toronto Greetings and Blessings to all assembled. on 20 Jan 1992 Dave.Aronson at f120.n109.z1.FidoNet.Org (Dave Aronson) wrote: /I have a question about the oil that was heated or set afire and then /poured from battlements onto attackers. What SORT of oil was it /usually? Mineral? Vegetable? Animal? Please be as specific as /possible. Ten queue. As far as I know, oil was only ever used *cold*, to cause slippage, and then rarely, due to expense (somewhere in my library is reference to two large jars of olive oil being a year's wages for an unskilled labourer). What WAS used was heated sand - reputedly, first deployed against Alexander the Great during his siege of one of the hilltop cities on his way to India. The method was to fill a vessel with sand (the ladles and beakers and crucibles from foundries were used) and bake it in the brick ovens for about half of one watch (say, 4 hours), until it glowed cherry red (about cone 012, 850 C, 1500 F - only sand that was nearly pure silica would take this treatment, any impurities would tend to lower its fusing point -that is, it would melt). It was then poured over invaders. Besides causing casualties directly, it also set flammables afire. It's use occasioned the same kind of consternation that napalm would today - indeed, they are similar in effect (thoroughly horrid). May God Bless and Keep you. Your servant, Fra. Capricornus 26 Jan 92 From: viking at iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson) Newsgroups: rec.org.sca Organization: Iowa State University, Ames IA >Dave.Aronson at f120.n109.z1.FidoNet.Org (Dave Aronson): >>I have a question about the oil that was heated or set afire and then >>poured from battlements onto attackers. What SORT of oil was it usually? >>Mineral? Vegetable? Animal? Please be as specific as possible. I would suspect it of being animal oil heated to the boiling point, mainly because I believe this to be the cheapest and most easily obtainable oil one could find inside a seiged castle. I do wonder at the very idea, though. Boiling waste water may as well have been used, as well as any other fluid one could boil. The idea was to distract, right? Why use oil when simple water would work just as well and be much cheaper for a beseiged castle to afford? Boiling honey is much worse than boiling oil, by the way, in that it sticks like napalm and burns almost as badly. If a castle had an ample supply this may have been used, but as a sugar source it was probably too valuable to waste pouring on attackers. Better the remains of the stew or the rancid milk nobody wanted to drink yesterday. <============================================================ < Erik Aarskog, Canton of Axed Root, located somewhere in Calontir > <============================================================ 28 Jan 92 From: cav at bnr.ca (Rick Cavasin) Organization: Bell-Northern Research Ltd. Reply-To: cav at bnr.ca (Rick Cavasin) Unto the good folk of the Rialto does Balderik send his greetings. Regarding burning oil, those having access to the technology would undoubtedly use Greek fire. As this was a closely guarded secret, it may not have been available outside Byzantium. Burning pitch seems to ring a bell in my memory. This again would have an effect like napalm, and might be somewhat cheaper than various oils. No doubt a certain amount could be stored in a castle for the purpose of defense. Regards, Balderik 30 Jan 92 From: 72007.302 at compuserve.COM (Clayton Neff) Newsgroups: rec.org.sca Organization: The Internet To: >INTERNET:SCA at mc.lcs.mit.edu Fujimoto writes: > Dave Aronson asks what sort of oil was poured onto attackers of a castle. > > If I recall correctly, pouring oil onto attackers was mostly a > Hollywood invention; you wouldn't waste good oil that way. > > On the other hand, you wouldn't mind wasting, say, chamber pot > contents on an attacker...this had the advantage that the attackers, > if they got in, could be immediately located.... ;-) > > Erik suggests boiling water, which seems unlikely for the same reason > that heated honey seems unlikely. You would NOT waste your limited > water supply that way, because if you ran out of water, you had to > surrender anyway. (Of course, if you had an unlimited water supply, > say like those castles on small rivers and what, then it's feasible). > When touring the castle at Conwy in Wales, our tour guide walked us through as if we were attacking it. After getting inside the city walls, crossing the dry moat, hacking our way through the drawbridge, crossing the next dry moat, and figthing our way through the first killing passage, we stood in the courtyard still outside the castle proper. (Realistically no one would have made it that far, as the obstacles were all but insurrmountable.) Here he pointed to the battlements and described the wooden platforms that were there in period, and he described the holes there would have been in the floors of them. He then proceeded to debunk the myths about boiling oil, lead, and water, for much the same reasons as have already been stated. What he said they did use, which was in large supply in castles in period was pitch. They would heat the pitch until it became liquid, and then pour it through the holes, setting it on fire with a torch as it went. This was an effective equivalent for naplam, as it stuck to whatever it touched and continued to burn. Very nasty stuff. The rest of the defenses of the castle were also _very_ impressive, and I wasn't surprised when he said the castle had never been taken by force. -- Logan -- Duncan Bruce of Logan Clayton Neff Forgotten Sea, Calontir Kansas City, MO Re: burning oil poured from castletops 31 Jan 92 From: trifid at agora.uucp (Roadster Racewerks) Newsgroups: rec.org.sca Organization: Open Communications Forum Both pitch and lead were commonly used in repair around the castle. Pitch for caulking and preserving rope, and lead for repair of roofs. There was also the rendered fat of the animals slaughtered to feed the garrison. In at least one case a plague victim was catapaulted into the enemy ranks by the dying opposition, and more than one injured or dead horse, mule, or ox made the same abrupt trip... Castles had an opening in the ceiling of the gate area, called, aptly, a "murder hole", where once the intruders got past the first defense they could be pinned in the entry, and hot pitch, large stones, spears and arrows could be rained down...whatever was lying around the house, so to speak. (Beams could be shoved behind the entry to block retreat, and often the drawbridge was arranged to slam them into this small space. Or some had a pit they were dumped into, and when it was lowered afterward, they were crushed by the counterweight. Very effective...) NicMaoilan Subject: ANST - "Medieval Warfare in Manuscripts" Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2001 14:14:08 -0600 From: Amy Forsyth To: ansteorra at ansteorra.org Something for both the illuminators and the fighters! ~Adela "Medieval Warfare in Manuscripts" Pamela Porter 64 p. : col. ill. ; c2000 University of Toronto Press co-published by the British Library ISBN 0802084001 est. cost? $15-$20 paperback Color illuminations taken from 40 manuscripts. Section titles: Introduction The art of war Knights, chivalry, and the training for war Knightly arms and armour Armies and battle Castles and sieges Gunpowder and the decline of Medieval warfare Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2007 18:24:13 -0600 (CST) From: jenne at fiedlerfamily.net Subject: [SCA-AS] [Fwd: TMR 07.11.05 France, Medieval Warfare (Hosler)] To: "Arts and Sciences in the SCA" , "East Kingdom A&S List" , eisental at browser.net ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- Subject: TMR 07.11.05 France, Medieval Warfare (Hosler) From: "The Medieval Review" Date: Tue, November 6, 2007 4:46 pm To: tmr-l at indiana.edu bmr-l at brynmawr.edu -------------------------------------------------------------------------- France, John, ed. "Medieval Warfare, 1000-1300". International Library of Essays on Military History. London: Ashgate, 2006. Pp. 644. $250.00. ISBN: 075462515X. Reviewed by John D. Hosler Morgan State University jhosler at jewel.morgan.edu John France has assembled a remarkable collection of articles for this volume in Ashgate's "International Library of Essays on Military History" series. It helps to complete the chronology of the Middle Ages by accompanying existing and forthcoming Ashgate volumes on Byzantium, medieval warfare between 1300 and 1450, and so-called "Dark Age" warfare of the post-Roman period (a volume co-edited by France and Kelly DeVries). Included essays do not have to abide by any preconceived thematic notions, and the assortment collected here ranges from battle studies to questions of defensive architecture and even gender. Given that France selected thirty-one articles for inclusion and provided a useful review essay in the Introduction, it would be tedious to review each and every item here. Instead, I'd like to review the contents and comment on their representation of warfare in the High Middle Ages. In the general preface, series editor Jeremy Black remarks that each volume contains, "the editor's selection of the most seminal recent essays on military history in their particular area of expertise" (ix). This suggests a widely-cast net that nonetheless allows for thematic repetition based on pure quality of research. Many subjects are thus treated in multiple essays, with a general breakdown as follows: the Crusades (12); castles, fortifications, and siege-craft (6); obligation, army composition, and knighthood/cavalry (5); finance and logistics (4); campaigns, generalship, and strategy (4); England (4); individual commanders (3); mercenaries (2); horses (2); and the Low Countries (2). Five articles center on individual battles, demonstrating the past and present fascination with field actions and what they reveal about generalship and tactics. The bulk of the essays cover warfare in two broadly construed geographical areas. The first of these is the Anglo-Norman world. Included are some very influential essays indeed, such as Stephen Brown's noteworthy inquiry on the role of mercenaries, Charles Coulson's important corrective to castle studies that emphasizes other elements of fortification beyond the architecturally defensive, and a trio of articles by Matthew Bennett, Michael Prestwich, and John Gillingham that have remained serious revisions on traditional views of the supremacy of cavalry and the uses of medieval battle. Other essays on Normandy, Flanders, Anjou, and England round out a reasonably full consideration of military operations in the Isles and French provinces (though Scottish, Irish, and Welsh warfare is notably absent). The second geographical focus of the book is warfare in the Latin east. Given that military study of the Crusades has become fashionable again in the past two decades a range of essays on the subject seems justifiable. Fully twelve of the thirty-one articles center on dimensions of crusading efforts. Fortifications and logistics figure heavily in France's selections: two studies of crusader castles, a third by A.J. Forey on the siege of Damascus in 1148, the maintenance of Western armies (Alan V. Murray), the transportation of horses by ship (John H. Prior), and the excellent and useful 1963 study by John W. Nesbitt on crusading armies' rates of march. France's own expertise is on display here, for the selections are remarkable for their insight and coverage. Acknowledging the book's geographical breakdown does not imply that one or multiple areas of inquiry are needlessly neglected; indeed, the essays are notable for their overall relevance and application across the wars of the period. However, there remains a certain lack of coverage. English military history both prior to the Battle of Hastings and after 1200 is absent, as are any explicitly French operations in the west (there is only one reference to Bouvines in the index, for example). Claude Gaier's essay on Liege and Looz is an important study of troop types, numbers, and regional conflicts in Brabant and points around the northern Rhine, but that is as far east as it gets: there is little coverage of the Empire and/or Italy unless it is connected to crusading ventures (such as H.E.J. Cowdrey's article on the 1087 Mahdia campaign). One wishes for expanded treatments of central Europe and also more peripheral areas such as Spain, an increasingly fertile area for military scholars, but there is only the older (1966) but useful study by Elena Lourie on its obligations and military institutions. France's collection does not seem to be intended as comprehensive, so complaints about scope and coverage are less a criticism than a regret that more space was unavailable. Physically, this is a formidable book at 644 pages with a semi- problematic layout. Each article is reprinted in its initial format and retains its original page numbers and font. This is very useful for reference purposes, and Ashgate has thoughtfully provided a separate pagination that runs through the entire volume (references to page numbers in this review refer to the latter). One unfortunate consequence of the reprinting, however, rears its head in the notations of the older articles. Many of the references are in abbreviated form because the original journal in which they appeared contained a list of common works and their shorthand forms. This becomes apparent in the very first article, John Prestwich's distinguished study on war and finance, which contains incomplete citations to the Dialogus de Scaccario (only one of three editors is listed and no publication date) and two separate references to Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII centuries and English Society in the Eleventh Century that lack either authors or any publication attribution (1-2). It appears that the more recent essays are essentially self-contained and do not suffer from such problems. The book's index is a rather large and useful, listing of both historical and modern names, but there are regrettably no entries for places or events. There are no maps, figures, or genealogical tables besides those provided in the original essays themselves, but these are generally sufficient for comprehension and of a high quality. The principal drawback of this volume, as is the case with every volume in the series, is its hefty price tag of 250 U.S. dollars, a cost that has often stayed my hand and wallet at conference book sales. Ashgate has planned thirty-four volumes in the series, and each volume published so far ranges in price between $195.00 and $250.00. The cost is thus prohibitive, even for those looking to purchase just the four projected volumes on the medieval Europe and Byzantium. I suspect most copies will be purchased by research libraries, for which such edited collections are good bargains, especially given the ubiquitous decline of institutional journal subscriptions. Is there a perfect method of collecting and publishing academic essays? One could complain about this or that subject being neglected or perhaps argue for a different thematic focus, but France's collection is undoubtedly one of prime importance that effectively highlights both older and newer trends in medieval military history. Every essay is valuable in its own right, and scholars of warfare would do well to add this book to their collections--or, perhaps, borrow a copy from their library. -- -- Jenne Heise / Jadwiga Zajaczkowa jenne at fiedlerfamily.net Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 08:52:17 +0800 From: Columb mac Diarmata Subject: [Lochac] Hundred year's war database online To: "The Shambles, the SCA Lochac mailing list" , WA SCA List http://www.webuser.co.uk/news/286497.html A website detailing the lives of 250,000 soldiers that served in the Hundred Years War has gone online. The site, which has been set up by researchers at Southampton and Reading Universities, is currently running slowly due to high levels of traffic. "Due to exceptional demand the site may run a little slowly today. Please check back soon!" a message on the site reads. The files, which relate to soldiers who served between 1369 and 1453, include salary and sickness records. The Medieval Soldier website also includes information about soldiers who served at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415. Records relating to John Judde, Merchant of London and Master of the Kings Ordinance, and John Fort esquire of Llanstephan, who was found guilty of treason, are also on the site. "The project has an innovative methodological approach and will be producing an online searchable resource for public use of immense value and interest to genealogists as well as social, political and military historians," a spokesman for the project said. http://www.medievalsoldier.org/ Columb From: robert segrest Date: April 20, 2011 1:37:33 PM CDT To: bryn-gwlad at lists.ansteorra.org Subject: Re: [Bryn-gwlad] Army <<< How many sq miles does a standing army in the 13th century take. Any one know? Oops. That's a army of 30 thousand >>> Your question needs a few more specifics to be answered with any accuracy and, to some degree, doesn't really have a definitive answer. I assume that you are asking because of some sort of a project where you want an estimate for the sake of realism. I will try to give you some parameters that will help you get a sense, if not a clear answer to your question. 1) It depends on what you mean by "Army". First of all, 30,000 people is a really big army for that time period. There were armies that large and larger, but most battles were fought by hundreds to thousands (based on a quick survey of 12th century battles on Wikipedia, but consistent with other reading I have done). Some of the Mongol armies have been estimated to be as large as 150,000 combatants. When we talk about pre-modern armies, we have to distinguish between combatants and people. Depending on whose army, where they were, what they were doing and other factors, an army might be little more than combatants or it might have 5 times as many people attached to it as would actually fight. These people would include supply trains, families, sightseers, etc. So it is important to distinguish what question you are asking. The amount a land an army might take to camp could have been far out of proportion to its number of combatants. 2) It depend on what you mean by room 'taken'. A foot soldier standing in ranks, then or now, takes about up about 8 square feet. That about a 2' by 2' space to stand in and another, equal space in between ranks. The square footage doesn't change much from a column of march to a line of battle. Cavalry take up a lot more space, I'm going to guess about 25 square feet for a horse and rider, with some room to maneuver, but I might be off on that estimate. Siege engines, baggage trains, etc. would take up substantially more room. That said, there are 27,878,400 sq. feet in a sq. mile. That means you could put almost 3.5 million infantry in ranks in a sq. miles space. At my estimate, you could put over a million cavalry in the same space. Working the other way, 30,000 infantry in ranks could fit in about 4 acres with some room to spare. Of course, you don't stand 30,000 men in ranks and try to fight a battle. The army would have been divided into many units and subunits. Usually an army would be somewhat divided between a center, right, and left divisions (generically, and there is o such thing a generic battle). Those divisions would have been divided further, sometimes along family or feudal lines, or possibly by unit lines in some of the eastern armies. Some units would be assigned to protect specific strategic locations. So the same number of men who could fit into about a modern city block might occupy an area of 10 or more square miles. Most medieval battlefields could be observed in their entirety from a single location (there are definitely exceptions) so you might envision a good size cow pasture. Sieges could be much larger, since the static nature of a siege allowed a commander to relax direct control. I hope this is helpful. If you really want to get a better picture, you'll have to read up on some actual battles. The Wikipedia list of battles is pretty good, but I doubt that anyone has compiled an exhaustive list. No matter what I, or anyone else tells you, there are exceptions to everything. Battles come in all shapes, sizes and cultural variations. In a time with no professional armies, no standard doctrines and sketchy communications, the nature of battles was pretty variable. If there are any specific questions you have, I'd be happy to do my best to answer them or refer you to someone who can Laszlo Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2009 10:12:32 -0500 From: Peter Holland Subject: [Ansteorra] check this out To: Baorny of Bjornsborg , "Kingdom of Ansteorra - SCA, Inc." found this on the BBC web site http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8160081.stm ------------------------------------ Thought it was interesting that the reason we have these records is because of the exchequer: Dr Bell said: "The service records survive because the English exchequer had a very modern obsession with wanting to be sure that the government's money was being spent as intended. "Therefore we have the remarkable survival of indentures for service detailing the forces to be raised, muster rolls showing this service and naming every soldier from duke to archer." He said accounts from captains showing how funds were spent and entries detailing when the exchequer requested the payments can be found. Hillary From: Kim Jones Date: July 21, 2009 11:03:06 AM CDT To: Barony of Bryn Gwlad Subject: [Bryn-gwlad] Soldiers of later medieval England Interesting site. If you go to database you can look up soldiers by name, rank etc. http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/soldier/database/index.php From: Coblaith Muimnech Date: July 23, 2009 2:25:51 PM CDT To: "Inc. Kingdom of Ansteorra - SCA" Subject: [Ansteorra] medieval soldiers' surnames We have over the last couple of days discussed the database for the The Soldier in Later Medieval England project, at , on this list, in threads with the subject lines "check this out", "here is the web site", "100 Years War soldier list", and "Agincourt war records". Questions were raised as to whether some or all of the surnames in the database might have been normalized, due to an ambiguous statement on the website. So I used the "for more information contact" link at the bottom of the index page to ask for clarification. Dr. Adrian Bell, Senior Lecturer in the History of Finance and Director of Teaching and Learning at the ICMA Centre, answered my inquiry, confirming that while the given names have been normalized, the surnames are unaltered. Coblaith Muimnech From: Conor mac Cinneide Date: April 20, 2011 11:22:02 PM CDT To: Barony of Bryn Gwlad Subject: Re: [Bryn-gwlad] Army At Crecy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) the English divided into three Battles (that is what the field units were called), one left, one right, and a reserve. The French could barely be called am army and there was no such pretty divisions of the army.  They were close to a rabble...except that it would be impolite to call nobles and knights a rabble.  They outnumbered the English by at least five to one and believed they would easily crush them. The English held a defensive position and the French units, if they can be called such, fed in one at a time in series because there was no organization, and the real commander was hours behind at the back of the train. My point here is that what they French did at these battles should not be ascribed to some French way of doing things.  Whatever plan the French commanders had was never put into action because the advance guard did wait for orders.  They simply attacked and each group of knights attacked in turn as they arrived at the battlefield, because they each wanted their piece of the glory and ransoms that would come from defeating the English.  There was never any thought that the outcome was in doubt. Sorry for the length, but the Hundred Years War is one of my interests. Lastly, numbers.... English 2000-10000 French 10000-50000 Most historians tend to the smaller numbers while the larger are from the period chroniclers. From: Zach Most Date: April 21, 2011 10:19:44 AM CDT To: Barony of Bryn Gwlad Subject: Re: [Bryn-gwlad] Army This is one of the biggest lessons we can learn from Bruce Lee movies. Don't send your ninjas in one at a time. The French commanders and chivalry can be condemned more completely for their tactical failures than even Burnside. They had three huge defeats for running frontal charges over broken ground at an entrenched army within the span of a single man's life- Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. They're pretty much the only battles in the Hundred Years War that anglophiles seem to study. I guess they don't want to think about the fact that England lost the war. Clifford Rogers and Kelly Devries have written some outstanding books on the subject recently that shed some new light on it. In their defense, the French saw that they mostly beat their English adversaries in other contexts. They did better in tournaments, both in jousting and foot combat. They won most of the sieges, and most smaller battles. Why should those battles have been any different? And it wasn't just glory the French knights were after. The ransom of even a modest lord was worth a fortune. To put it in context- when the count of Nevers was captured by the Turks in 1396, the ransom was roughly the GDP of Burgundy, one of the most prosperous regions of Europe, for two years. There were English kings, princes, dukes and barons in those happy little bands. Adjusted for inflation it's literally saying you could get 4 trillion dollars (that's 2x the GDP of Great Britain) for charging up a hill and pummelling some guys you've beaten before. Seriously it took a force of will and a lot of yelling from our commanders to keep our guys from crossing a bridge at Gulf War. You want to put 4 trillion dollars on the table and try to hold them back? Best of luck to you. Random points- Poitiers was complicated by the vow of the order of the Star, to not retreat. They lost a lot of good men. I'd wager that Connor's numbers were concocted by an English minister of propaganda. Gaston From: Marlin and Amanda Stout To: Barony of Bryn Gwlad Sent: Thu, April 21, 2011 7:01:56 AM Subject: Re: [Bryn-gwlad] Army Conor mac Cinneide wrote: At Crecy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) the English divided into three Battles (that is what the field units were called), one left, one right, and a reserve. The English held a defensive position and the French units, if they can be called such, fed in one at a time in series because there was no organization, and the real commander was hours behind at the back of the train. A situation Gen. Burnside should have recognized (and avoided) 5 centuries later at Fredricksburg. Just goes to show that the old saw about not learning from history really is true. My point here is that what they French did at these battles should not be ascribed to some French way of doing things. Whatever plan the French commanders had was never put into action because the advance guard did wait for orders. They simply attacked and each group of knights attacked in turn as they arrived at the battlefield, because they each wanted their piece of the glory and ransoms that would come from defeating the English. There was never any thought that the outcome was in doubt. It should also be pointed out that the French nobility were also exceedingly concerned with personal honor and glory, to the exclusion of military sense. You would expect, in an army the size of that which the French fielded at Crecy and Poitiers (or later at Agincourt) that somebody would recognize that piecemeal attacks were suicidal and hold back the follow-on units until they could be organized into an attack that had a prayer of succeeding. If anyone did, and tried to do anything about it, he would have been ignored by knights and lords whose main concern was to get into the fight so as not to lose out on the glory, or to not be seen by their peers as cowards for delaying their entry into the battle. Which says volumes about the importance of an army being trained to act as a whole, rather then being a gaggle of different armed mobs. Charles From: Conor mac Cinneide Date: April 21, 2011 10:24:36 AM CDT To: Barony of Bryn Gwlad Subject: Re: [Bryn-gwlad] Army Actually, the French did learn a lesson from Crecy and Poitiers, and changed tactics for the next 50 years. Few people seem to remember that between Poitiers in 1356 and Agincourt in 1415, the French had won back most of what they had lost. Unfortunately, they fell into the same trap at Agincourt and suffered the same type of defeat. Even in those days people failed to learn from history. From: Conor mac Cinneide Date: April 21, 2011 11:01:04 AM CDT To: Barony of Bryn Gwlad Subject: Re: [Bryn-gwlad] Army I replied to another message before seeing this, so you can read that for some thoughts on French tactics. While technically Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt are fought in one man's lifespan, 69 years, no one who fought at Crecy would still have been fighting at Agincourt. The French have a different King at each of three battles, and the losses at Crecy were so heavy that the list of nobles at Poitiers are mostly young men. "I'd wager that Connor's numbers were concocted by an English minister of propaganda. Gaston" Of course, most of it comes from Froisart...at least the huge numbers come from him. More modern historians tend towards the lower numbers and a ratio closer to 2:1 or 3:1, rather than the 5:1 that is generally claimed by the chroniclers closer to the actual events, who were generally writing for the English. The victors write the history. Edited by Mark S. 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